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A simple spin model is studied, motivated by the dynamics of traders in a market where expectation
bubbles and crashes occur. The dynamics is governed by interactions which are frustrated across
different scales: While ferromagnetic couplings connect each spin to its local neighborhood, an
additional coupling relates each spin to the global magnetization. This new coupling is allowed to
be anti-ferromagnetic. The resulting frustration causes a metastable dynamics with intermittency
and phases of chaotic dynamics. The model reproduces main observations of real economic markets
as power-law distributed returns and clustered volatility.
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Market dynamics emerging from a large number of in-
teracting agents have raised considerable interest [1]. The
resulting phenomena often are difficult to capture in sim-
ple models, in particular equilibrium concepts fail in de-
scribing specific dynamical properties of markets. Among
such phenomena are expectation bubbles and subsequent
crashes of expectation driven quantities [2–4].
Recently, fruitful attempts have been made to under-
stand such emergent phenomena in systems of many in-
teracting agents, e.g. [5–7]. Remarkably simple models
can in principle capture essential features and, vice versa,
provide toy systems that are as such interesting for sta-
tistical physics (but would hardly be written down from
a pure physics perspective). One example of a simple
model is the El Farol bar problem [8], most commonly
known in a simplified formulation as the minority game
[9]. In this game, agents split into two groups, how-
ever, only being in the minority group is rewarded and
thus beneficial for each agent. This leads to a globally
frustrated state as every single agent will try to reach
this state. Similar interactions occur in real markets as,
for example, it is often desirable to be in the minority
when buying or selling a certain commodity. The mi-
nority game describes the evolution of strategic choices
in a collective system within such a simple frustrated
boundary condition. Beyond this aspect, the elementary
minority game does not provide a model for the more de-
tailed dynamics of financial markets, e.g. the dynamics of
prices, as it is a very simplistic model. A recent attempt
to include more general aspects of market dynamics into
the minority game shows that quite complicated exten-
sions are necessary, at the price of dropping the elegant
simplicity of the original minority game [10].
A complementary class of dynamical models for mar-
kets is formed by recent models of stock markets where
trading agents are simulated, including an explicit price
formation process, e.g. [7,11,12]. A particularly realistic
model is the one by Lux and Marchesi [12,13] who classify
the agents into two basic strategies (“fundamentalists”
and “optimistic/pessimistic chartists”). Prices form as a
result of the trading activity, and strategies are chosen
by each agent on the basis of profitability w.r.t. past ac-
tions. The resulting model reproduces several non-trivial
properties observed in real markets, as power-law dis-
tributed returns ret(t) = ln(p(t))− ln(p(t− 1)) of prices
p(t), and a high autocorrelation of price volatility. Also,
on the level of strategies, it shows the phenomenon that
the number of chartists (or noise traders) correlates with
phases of high volatility, as also seen in real markets. The
Lux-Marchesi-Model therefore is quite successful. From
the theoretical point of view its only drawback is a high
complexity with more than 10 free parameters and con-
siderable tuning. While this does not matter in economic
applications of the model, a theoretical analysis of the ba-
sic mechanisms at work is not easy, facing a large number
of details in the model.
In this article, therefore, a third path will be sketched,
formulating a model with maximum simplicity, while in-
cluding details of strategic interactions in a market. It
can be viewed as an extremely simplified version of a
stock market model in the form of a spin model with
only two alternatives, designed to simulate the dynam-
ics of expectations in systems of many agents. While
spin models have a tradition in economic theory [14–17],
the critical properties of such models are often difficult
to relate to real economic situations, at least without
tuning. In particular, large fluctuations as often seen in
real economic data [18,19] usually appear only near the
critical point of spin models. One possibility to capture
these features in a spin model is to reformulate a stock
market model in terms of a generalized spin models as,
for example, demonstrated by Chowdhury and Stauffer
who recast the Cont-Bouchaud-Model in terms of “super
spins” [20]. Also the random field Ising model can be
related to critical properties of stock market dynamics
[21].
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Let us here take a different approach and rather start
from scratch by asking, what are the basic forces at work?
There are at least two major conflicting forces seen in eco-
nomic action:
1. “Do what your neighbors do”, as often seen in the ac-
tion of noise traders and as modeled in the herd behavior
of strategic choices in the Lux-Marchesi-Model, and:
2. “Do what the minority does”, as often followed by
traders with knowledge about fundamental values and as
modeled in the minority game.
We here combine these two conflicting interactions in
a simple spin model: On the one hand, the neighbor in-
teraction is represented as a standard nearest neighbor
interaction of a spin model. On the other hand, a cou-
pling to the minority as a global observable is introduced
by a coupling to the global magnetization of the spin
system.
Consider a model with i = 1, ..., N spins with orienta-
tions Si(t) = ±1. The dynamics of the spins depends on
the local field hi(t), for simplicity assume that each spin
is updated with a heat-bath dynamics according to
Si(t+ 1) = +1 with p = 1/ [1 + exp (−2βhi(t))]
Si(t+ 1) = −1 with 1− p. (1)
The local field containing the interactions discussed
above is further specified by
hi(t) =
N∑
j=1
Jij Sj − α Ci(t)
1
N
N∑
j=1
Sj(t). (2)
The first term is chosen as a local Ising Hamiltonian with
nearest neighbor interactions Jij = J and Jij = 0 for all
other pairs. This term thus induces local ferromagnetic
order. The second term is a global coupling to the mag-
netization of the system with a coupling α > 0. Its sign
determines the strategy of agent i. It is specified sepa-
rately by a second spin Ci(t), representing the strategy of
agent i with respect to the magnetization. In particular,
this second coupling allows for the case of spins frus-
trated across scales, seeking ferromagnetic order locally,
but anti-ferromagnetic order globally. Similar couplings
to the total magnetization are known for magnets with
dipole interactions as “demagnetizing field” which in the
context of market models are reminiscent of the welfare
state mode of the Levy-Solomon-Huang-Model [22].
What is the basic dynamics of this system? Several sce-
narios can be realized depending on value and dynamics
of the strategy spin field. Let us consider the simplest
possibilities. First, consider the case where the strategy
is always Ci(t) = 1, ∀i, t. Each agent then, besides
the local ferromagnetic coupling to the neighbors, has an
anti-ferromagnetic coupling to the magnetization. This,
in a sense follows a motivation reminiscent of the minor-
ity game, inducing a force to align with the minority of
spins in the system. In contrast to the minority game,
however, it is complemented by a conflicting ferromag-
netic term which the minority game lacks. The dynamics
with Ci(t) = 1 then corresponds to traders, who, in addi-
tion to a basic level of ferromagnetic noise trading, have
a desire to join the global minority, for example in order
to invest in possible future gains. Thus the Ci(t) = 1
traders can be called fundamentalists. If every agent
follows this strategy, the global dynamics of the model
will quickly lead to a near-vanishing magnetization, even
for lower-than-critical temperatures T < Tc, resulting in
a “soft” conserved order parameter Ising model. Large
fluctuations in the magnetization are suppressed in this
case.
The dynamics of the system becomes more interesting
once agents are allowed to follow two different strategies
s.t. also the strategy Ci(t) = −1 occurs in the spin sys-
tem which corresponds to a ferromagnetic coupling to the
global magnetization. This strategy is called the chartist
strategy as agents tend to follow the majority of traders.
Initializing the model with a fixed ratio of the two strate-
gies, one observes a transition between the conserved or-
der parameter regime, where fundamentalists dominate,
and a globally magnetized state with strongly attractive
fixed points at the two points of maximum magnetiza-
tion. This is where chartists dominate.
It remains to define the transition rule between the two
strategies as each trader will tend to choose an optimal
strategy which in general will not result in a fixed ratio
of the two strategies. Let us consider the simplest pos-
sible scenario for local strategy changes. An agent who
is in the majority group will often tend to switch to the
minority group, e.g. in order to opt for future prospec-
tive returns of that not-yet fashionable commodity (and
possibly escape a future crash of its currently popular
good). As such an option is only available at a cost (the
effort to obtain information, the potential risk as it af-
fects prospective future return, etc.), the corresponding
term will increase the local energy of the agent. Vice
versa, let us assume that an agent who is in the minor-
ity (thus expecting future returns) might be unsatisfied
with present returns, the more so, the larger the major-
ity group of agents is, whose returns correlate with the
current popularity of the commodity. Again, this op-
tion comes at a price accounted for by a positive energy
term. The scenario is summarized under the simple as-
sumption that a trader in the majority will always choose
strategy Ci(t) = 1, while a minority trader will always
choose Ci(t) = −1: Each trader chooses the risky strat-
egy for the prospect of higher returns. The dynamics of
the strategy spins then is
Ci(t+ 1) = −Ci(t) if α Si(t) Ci(t)
N∑
j=1
Sj(t) < 0. (3)
Each agent thus faces a certain penalty for his strategic
action, which increases with the absolute value of mag-
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netization. This is motivated by the fact that in general
speculation costs rise in times with high volatility.
A particularly simple model is obtained, if the strategy
adjustment is assumed to be done instantaneously. Then,
the strategy spin drops out altogether and we obtain a
simple spin model with the local field defined as
hi =
N∑
j=1
Jij Sj − α Si
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
N∑
j=1
Sj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(4)
with a global coupling constant α > 0. While the first
term tends to align the spin with its neighbors, the second
term tends to encourage a spin flip when magnetization
gets large.
The dynamics of this model is characterized by
metastable phases of approximate undercritical Ising dy-
namics and intermediate phases of rapid rearrangements,
reminiscent of overcritical dynamics. An example of sub-
sequent snapshots in a 2d system is shown in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1. Subsequent snapshots of the spin dynamics
of a 32x32 lattice at undercritical temperature, taken at
t = 611, 2046, 2913, 3527 sweeps (Monte Carlo updates).
The first and third snapshots are taken during a metastable
phase, the second and fourth are in the turbulent regime,
where memory of global spatial structures disintegrates.
Here, a 32x32 lattice of the general version of the model
as defined in eq. (2) and where the strategy spins are up-
dated according to eq. (3) is shown. It is simulated at
temperature T = 1/β = 1.5 and with couplings J = 1
and α = 4, using random serial and asynchronous heat
bath updates of single sites. Note that the temperature
is below the critical temperature T < Tc = 2.269 of the
case α = 0. For every spin Si that is updated, the strat-
egy spin Ci is updated subsequently. The way the change
of strategies is defined here, the model is to a large ex-
tent identical to the simplified version eq. (4), but in
addition keeps track of the ratio of strategy choices. A
metastable phase occurs at randomly frozen finite magne-
tization values, which, in the language of market dynam-
ics, is the analogue of a bubble-related value of a good
that emerged without any fundamental cause. Identify-
ing a spin Si = +1 with a buyer and Si = −1 with a
seller, the spin value can be viewed as the demand of an
agent i and the total excess demand, or magnetization,
can be related to global price changes [7]. Thus inter-
preting magnetization M(t) = 1
N
∑N
j=1 Sj as a measure
of price, it is interesting to plot its logarithmic relative
change ret(t) = ln(M(t))− ln(M(t−1)), where intermit-
tent phases are nicely visible (Fig. 2).
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FIG. 2. Return or logarithmic relative change of magneti-
zation of the 2d model as defined above.
Comparing this observable to economic returns, fea-
tures as non-Gaussian fluctuations and clustered phases
of large fluctuations are observed here that are also
known from real economic data. More specifically, the
cumulative distribution of returns as derived from the
magnetization of this model shows a pronounced power-
law scaling (Fig. 3).
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FIG. 3. Cumulative distribution of absolute returns ex-
hibits power-law scaling. The 32x32 model is defined as above
with parameters T = 1.0 and α = 8 and sampled over 106
sweeps.
The second feature, also seen in Fig. 2, are phases of
high volatility that are strongly clustered. To quantify
this, the corresponding autocorrelation of absolute re-
turns is shown in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4. Autocorrelation of absolute returns as a measure
of volatility clustering. Model parameters are as in previous
figure.
An interesting numerical experiment is to look at the
first formulation of the above model, where strategy
changes are explicitly tracked in the strategy spin vari-
able Ci(t): Each agent switches its strategy to the op-
posite value, if the new strategy will be more risky (re-
sults in higher energy). This allows to see how strategy
choices correlate to the phases of high volatility. Indeed,
phases of high variance in changes of magnetization cor-
relate with the number of agents that play the chartist
strategy (Fig. 5).
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FIG. 5. Fraction of chartists in the same run as shown in
Fig. 1. A high number of chartists coincides with phases of
high volatility.
The simple spin model studied here reproduces ma-
jor observational features of real economic markets. Due
to its simplicity, it offers a chance to understand basic
mechanisms at work in economic systems of many agents
competing for commodities, as well as the possibility of
analytic tractability that is often not given in complex
agent simulations of the same phenomena.
We here considered the model in 2d which is the lowest
non-trivial number of dimensions. Many simple variants
of the model are an obvious target of future research:
Other dimensions or neighborhoods, the spin glass vari-
ants with random couplings, and other strategy changing
rules (when including an explicit strategy spin), as well
as a general q-state model with more than 2 states.
The spin model studied here shows intermittent behav-
ior as a result of competition between conflicting local
and global interactions. While exhibiting a phase transi-
tion at higher temperatures, it is considered here in the
undercritical phase. As a result, the basic observation oc-
curs in a wide temperature range and does not depend on
tuning: Self-organization of the spin system to a regime
dominated by metastable phases with intermittent disor-
der.
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